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Several  attempts  have  been  made  to explain  the  formation  of  collaborative  watershed  partnerships—that
is,  multi-actor  groups  which  work  together  to  resolve  environmental  problems  at  a  watershed  scale.  But
to what  extent  do these  explanations  ‘travel’  from  their  original  home  – namely  the  USA  –  to  other
jurisdictions,  where  similar  claims  are  being  made  about  the  rise  of  collaborative  environmental  gov-
ernance?  To that end,  this  article  critically  evaluates  how  well  one  leading  theory,  namely  the  political
contracting  framework  (PCF),  explains  their  emergence  in  the  rather  different  institutional  context  of
the United  Kingdom.  Drawing  on a survey  of  collaborative  watershed  practices,  it argues  that  they  areollaborative governance
nstitutional development
ravelling problem
atchment management
functionally  equivalent  to partnerships.  Furthermore,  when  suitably  amended,  the  PCF  explains  many
important  aspects  of  their  emergence.  The  same  critical  factors  are  associated  with  their  development,
but  these  should  now  be assessed  across  the  entire  ‘life-cycle’  of  partnerships.  The  implications  of  these
ﬁndings  are identiﬁed  and  explored,  the  underlying  aim  being  to  inform  a much  more  comparative  theo-
retical  approach  to understanding  what  appear  to be important  changes  in  collaborative  environmental
governance  practices.ntroduction
During the last few decades, water policy has allegedly under-
one two fundamental transformations. Starting in the 1960s,
mportant tasks were ﬁrstly centralised, with top-down, hierar-
hical (i.e. regulatory) forms of water governance emerging in
any contexts, including the USA (Gerlak, 2006) and the vari-
us states of the European Union (EU) (Benson and Jordan, 2008).
hey tended to operate in a rather technocratic fashion (Sabatier
t al., 2005a: 3), with the role of the public and other stake-
olders limited to commenting on and responding to initiatives
mposed from the top down. Secondly, in the period since the
980s, this ‘traditional approach’ has, it has been widely argued,
een transformed into what are increasingly termed ‘collaborative’
anagement approaches (Sabatier et al., 2005a: 3).
According to Sabatier et al. (2005b: 49) these approachesxhibit a number of speciﬁc characteristics: (1) the employment
f the watershed as the principal ‘jurisdictional’ focus of man-
gement efforts; (2) a more active inclusion of a wider range of
∗ Corresponding author at: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of
nvironmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich
R4 7TJ, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 01603 591545.
E-mail address: d.benson@uea.ac.uk (D. Benson).
264-8377/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2012.05.016© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
stakeholders; (3) a ‘reliance on face to face negotiations’ to engen-
der ‘civility’ and ‘trust’ amongst all the participants; (4) the aim of
attaining ‘win–win’ solutions that address the three dimensions of
sustainability; (5) a preliminary and ‘fairly extensive fact-ﬁnding
phase designed to develop common understanding’ of the main
problems and available solutions (for other deﬁnitions see Bidwell
and Ryan, 2006; Margerum, 2008, 2011).
These approaches are not, of course, restricted to the water
policy area; collaborative approaches in other, non-water sectors
have also attracted a great deal of academic comment (for exam-
ple, Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Koontz et al., 2004; Heikkila
and Gerlak, 2005). But it is in the US water sector that some of
the most sophisticated analytical work has arguably been done
to understand their emergence and prevalence (Benson et al.,
2013). Sabatier et al. (2005a: 6) usefully identify three main
varieties:• Collaborative engagement processes: conﬂict management
approaches that typically have a limited duration.
• Collaborative superagencies:  formalised partnerships composed
of multiple government agencies and external stakeholders that
engage in negotiating and implementing management plans.
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These are limited in number and include the CALFED Bay-Delta
Program in California.1
Collaborative watershed partnerships: relatively informal organ-
isations involving a wide variety of stakeholders. They provide
a forum for collaboratively negotiating plans, and then passing
them over to partners for implementation. They have a relatively
long duration (5–10 years) and are said to be common, with 150
alone recorded in California (Leach and Pelkey, 2001).2
In view of their popularity, the existing literature has tended
o focus mainly on the third variety (for example, Duram et al.,
008). Yet even in the USA, collaborative watershed partnerships
ppear in a number of very different forms (Koontz et al., 2004;
argerum, 2007, 2008). Some, for example, are steered in a more
op down fashion by government agencies and exist at an intra
r even interstate scale (see Koontz et al., 2004). One well known
xample, the New York City Watershed Protection Program, arose
hrough the efforts of city authorities to prioritise collaborative
takeholder engagement on drinking water issues, by agreeing a
emorandum of Agreement with the federal-level Environmen-
al Protection Agency (Smith and Porter, 2010). Others are more
ommunity based and involve multiple actors. In one example, the
arby Creek Partnership was established as a non-proﬁt organisa-
ion with only minimal input from central public bodies (Koontz
t al., 2004). Scholars who want to understand the ‘collaborative
urn’ in environmental management should be alive to these subtle
ut important differences.
Academics have responded to these changing patterns of col-
aboration by deriving multiple hypotheses to account for the
xistence of different kinds of partnership (for example, Leach and
elkey, 2001; Lubell et al., 2002; Lubell, 2005; Sabatier et al., 2005c).
ne approach derives from the institutional rational choice (IRC)
heories of Ostrom, and is based on the notion that collective action
greements emerge from the interaction of self-maximising indi-
iduals (Ostrom, 1990, 1999, 2005). In their landmark contribution,
abatier et al. (2005c), drawing on Lubell et al.  (2002),  combine
ifferent insights from IRC to inform what they dub the political
ontracting framework (PCF). The contract in question is the collec-
ive action agreement between polluters and other stakeholders,
hich they analyse to determine a watershed group’s development
Lubell et al., 2002). They use this framework to generate hypothe-
es on how and why some watershed partnerships emerge and
urvive (i.e. ‘swim upstream’ – to paraphrase the title of their well-
nown book), whereas others quickly die (‘sink’) or perhaps never
ven emerge at all. Partnerships, they suggest, emerge in response
o a number of biophysical, institutional and community factors,
hich are summarised in more detail below.
Together, this work abundantly satisﬁes their main
bjective—‘to set a new standard for studies of collaborative man-
gement approaches’ (Sabatier et al., 2005a: 13). It is undoubtedly
 big step beyond the rather ad hoc, non-cumulative case studies
hat once represented the state of the art in this ﬁeld. But although
heir work offers a plausible explanation for partnership formation
rocesses in the US, we know nothing whatsoever about its
pplicability outside that particular setting. The question that we
ish to pursue in this paper is whether or not these arguments and
heir associated theories and analytical concepts ‘travel’ (Peters,
998: 39)  to a very different institutional context namely the UK,
hich is politically much more centralised (see Pierson, 1994).
lthough understanding ‘travelling’ was not their initial purpose
1 Although the authors use this example, other such governance forms could
nclude The Chesapeake Bay Program and the Great Lakes Commission.
2 Duram et al. (2008) record the existence of over 1000 local watershed groups in
he  USA.icy 30 (2013) 748– 757 749
(but see Sabatier et al., 2005a: 12, 19), the value of the PCF would
now seem to be sufﬁciently well established to justify taking this
additional analytical step. Then we  would know whether it is
indeed transferable to a different jurisdiction or just applicable to
the US. Furthermore, is it sufﬁcient to do what Sabatier et al. have
done and focus mainly on the emergence and development of
such partnerships, or is a longer term perspective (assessing their
potential to endure or ultimately extending throughout their full
life cycle) now warranted? These are the broad challenges that we
seek to address in this paper.
We  do so by tackling a number of questions. Firstly, we investi-
gate what kinds of collaborative approaches are developing in the
UK and we ask if they are functionally equivalent to those in the US.
This is an extremely important question to pose, because without
careful and tightly framed analysis of common concepts, we  run the
risk of ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1970: 1034). That is to say, by
taking a context speciﬁc concept (such as ‘watershed partnerships’)
and uncritically applying it in a different context could mean that
‘gains in extensional coverage. . .[are] matched by losses in con-
notative precision’ (Sartori, 1970: 1035). This feature is arguably
already apparent in the environmental geography literature on col-
laboration, where the concept of collaboration is subject to multiple
but subtly differing interpretations across political cultures, juris-
dictions, time and space (see for example, Wondolleck and Yaffee,
2000; Margerum, 2011; Benson et al., 2013). Such differences
between jurisdictions are of course the very essence of insightful
comparative research, without which social science understand-
ing would struggle to advance beyond essentially non-cumulative
single case studies. But if we do not think about functional equiv-
alence (and thus compare like with like), we would experience a
‘travelling problem’ (Sartori, 1970: 1033), which Peters (1998: 86)
argues is the most fundamental of all inhibitors of good compara-
tive research.
Secondly, if partnerships are functionally equivalent in the two
countries, then just how prevalent are they in the UK, why are they
forming and what are their life histories? Are they relatively short
lived phenomena (i.e. do they quickly ‘sink’) or do they have the
potential to endure (‘swim’) over longer periods of time? In this
section, empirical data from a broad-based survey covering England
and Wales (Cook et al., 2012) is used.
Thirdly, how well does the PCF explain the full development of
partnerships in the two jurisdictions—in other words how well does
it, the theory, ‘travel’ from the empirical setting of the US to the UK?
Unlike much theory in the policy sciences (see Peters, 1998), the PCF
is fairly precisely articulated, contains testable hypotheses, and is
grounded in empirical research. In principle, it therefore represents
a good candidate for ‘travelling’ as it already explains a good deal. In
this paper we aim to explore the limits of its explanatory power. In
the ﬁnal section we conclude by evaluating the wider implications
of our research for: (i) the practices of collaborative environmental
governance; and (ii) comparative academic research more gener-
ally.
Before proceeding we  would like to make two  further points.
The ﬁrst concerns case selection. The UK is different to the USA in
terms of its governance (Pierson, 1994; Pierre, 2005). Moreover,
the key differences between the two are relatively well known
and understood. Most obviously, the USA is a multi-level federal
system composed of state, federal and local governments (Watts,
2008). By contrast, the UK is a devolving unitary state (Connelly
et al., 2012). Secondly, there are important differences in the way
in which decision making powers or tasks are allocated between
levels in these two systems. Tasks in the US are shared between
local, state and federal governments to a relatively greater extent
than in the UK, where powers are still more heavily concentrated
in central or devolved government agencies (Benson et al., 2012,
2013). Indeed the UK has increasingly adopted a more centralised
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pproach to environmental management, whereas in the USA there
as been relatively greater autonomy at the state-local level con-
istent with the precepts of federalism (for example, Gerlak, 2006;
ischman, 2006).
Secondly, in this paper we are primarily interested in the emer-
ence and not the environmental and/or democratic effectiveness
f collaborative partnerships. Although the latter is important to
ome scholars (including Sabatier et al., 2005a),  it is difﬁcult to anal-
se all three empirically in one jurisdiction let alone comparatively
n a journal article. Therefore we opt to look at what Sabatier et al.
erm the ‘process’ dimension rather than policy outputs (the for-
ulation of restoration plans for example) or watershed outcomes
i.e. improvements in ecological conditions) (Sabatier et al., 2005a:
4).  On this aspect, there is some ambiguity in their conceptualisa-
ion of ‘success’ (Sabatier et al., 2005a: 15). They subsequently argue
Sabatier et al., 2005c: 184) that their PCF hypotheses can be used
o explain the initial formation of partnerships over an extended
ime period but do not really clarify whether this includes ‘success’
eyond this start-up phase, i.e. do they ‘swim’ or do they eventually
sink’? Therefore in this paper we attempt to explore the limits of
his particular aspect of their approach by distinguishing between
ifferent stages in the life history of partnerships, namely birth
‘diving in’), indicators of potential for development and sustained
ctivity (‘swimming’) and expiration (‘sinking’).
The data describing watershed-scale collaborative approaches
n England and Wales was collected in the third quarter of 2009
sing a standardised questionnaire comprised of both closed and
pen questions covering the local biophysical, institutional and
ommunity conditions. The sample unit for the survey was  deﬁned
s “an assembly of stakeholders who convene (periodically or reg-
larly) to discuss, negotiate, plan or implement the management
f streams, rivers or catchments (including land based measures
nd best practices designed to inﬂuence water quantity or qual-
ty) on a catchment-wide basis”. The sample frame of such groups
hat exist on a non-statutory basis was identiﬁed through the com-
ined use of the expert knowledge of key informants, a web-based
earch and access to the database of The Rivers Trust (the ‘umbrella’
ody of the rivers trust movement). Candidate groups for inter-
iew were contacted and from this initial search and screening,
hirty nine were identiﬁed and subsequently surveyed. This deﬁ-
ition excluded narrow single interest groups such as angling or
anoeing clubs. The sample frame identiﬁed by this process is con-
idered a close approximation to the actual population of relevant
roups at the time of the survey (Cook et al., 2012).
The ‘non-statutory’ groups described above are the emerging
henomenon of primary interest but it is important to note that
statutory’ groups also exist in the sector for the purposes of consul-
ation and information exchange with stakeholder representatives.
n order to better differentiate the purposes and characteristics
f statutory and non-statutory initiatives, a purposive sample of
ight ‘statutory groups’ was also surveyed; four each from the
nvironment Agency Anglian and South West regions, and namely
he Regional Fisheries, Ecology and Recreation Advisory Commit-
ee, the Regional Environmental Protection Advisory Committee, a
ater Framework Directive River Basin District Liaison Panel and
 Catchment Flood Management Plan Steering Group. Information
as also gathered about the number of Catchment Steering Groups
hat inform the implementation of the England Catchment Sensi-
ive Farming Delivery Initiative in selected priority catchments.
Interviewees selected for the survey were typically trustees or
epresentatives regarded as either senior (such as chair or sec-
etary) or otherwise well informed about the group’s activities.
espondents were mainly interviewed by telephone using the
tructured questionnaire (a small number were interviewed in per-
on or responded by post). Variables collected included: the age of
he group; its organisational structure; size; membership; sourcesicy 30 (2013) 748– 757
and stability of ﬁnance; legal status; leading motivation; links with
statutory bodies; perceived policy inﬂuence; modes of represen-
tation; knowledge exchange mechanisms; international linkages;
and perceived constraints to mission achievement.
Theorising the life histories of collaborative partnerships
The existing literature is replete with arguments detailing the
conditions under which collaborative watershed partnerships form
and develop (i.e. ‘diving in’ and ‘swimming’). The most signiﬁ-
cant and robust body of theory draws on institutional rational
choice (IRC) arguments, themselves rooted in rational institutional
theory (Chhotary and Stoker, 2009). Within this approach, indi-
viduals are assumed to be self-interested and utility maximising,
while collective action is governed by speciﬁc institutions. In this
sense, institutions are understood not as organisational entities but
as rules determining the participation of individuals and organi-
sations in environmental management. Subject to their resource
constraints and bounded rationality, rational actors will engage in
collaborative solutions to common property resource dilemmas if
the beneﬁts of the outcomes for them outweigh the transactions
costs of collaboration.
Two complementary conceptual frameworks seek to apply IRC
theory. The institutional analysis and development (IAD) frame-
work seeks identiﬁcation and description of multi-level action
arenas in which decision making takes place, and the situational
characteristics of relevant actors. Analysis seeks to show how
observed patterns of actor behaviour, interaction and outcomes are
determined by the constraints of the action arena and its actors (for
example, Ostrom, 1990, 1999, 2005). The complementary politi-
cal contracting framework (PCF) places emphasis on the process
of consensus building and agreement of rules for collaborative
behaviour. Collaborative arrangements are expected to succeed
when, compared to the alternatives, they reduce the inherent trans-
action costs of political contracting; that is, the costs of devising
mutually beneﬁcial institutions, bargaining over trade-offs, and
monitoring and enforcing agreements. The transaction costs of gov-
ernance institutions are expected to be lower when the structure
of political institutions is well matched to the characteristics of the
policy challenge at hand (Lubell, 2003, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2005c).
The work of such authors demonstrates that this framework offers
an understanding of the formation of collaborative watershed man-
agement arrangements that can be used to hypothesise empirically
grounded conditions for partnership success or failure.
The political contracting framework
Sabatier et al. (2005c) developed and applied the PCF as a
synthesis and hybridisation of earlier arguments derived from
the institutional rational choice approach described above, most
notably the IAD theory (Ostrom, 1999, 2005) and earlier quan-
titative research by Lubell et al. (2002).  It offers an institutional
approach to understanding the formation and survival of US
watershed management partnerships, using quantitative analysis
to identify potential factors (biophysical, political-economic and
social) inﬂuencing their development.
According to Sabatier et al. (2005c: 179–183), political contract-
ing can offer effective and sustainable solutions to certain collective
action problems in water management. They argue that solutions
emerge through a process whereby stakeholders reach mutual
agreement on, and cooperate under, a set of institutions govern-
ing collaboration. These institutions are perceived by the authors
as a form of ‘contract’, analogous to a legal agreement between par-
ties (Sabatier et al. (2005c: 180). In this sense, the contract provides
mutually developed rules governing the collaboration of different
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takeholders in the management of environmental resources. A
ritical factor in the development of these institutions are ‘trans-
ction costs’ (Sabatier et al. (2005c: 180)). Transaction costs are
ommonly understood in the economics literature as costs to con-
racting parties incurred through engaging in an exchange, for
xample, reaching an agreement or contract (Williamson, 1979;
ahlman, 1979). These costs can be accrued both ﬁnancially but
lso temporally, in terms of time devoted to developing institu-
ions. Subject to bounded rationality, if transaction costs exceed
he expected beneﬁt from an exchange and actors are rational and
tility-maximising, they will walk away from the transaction. In
he context of watershed management, where transaction costs
re perceived to outweigh the beneﬁts, stakeholders will not will-
ngly collaborate (see Lubell et al., 2002). For example, it may  be
ostly for local people to engage in collaborative activities–the costs
f transport for example or the opportunity costs of doing some-
hing else with their time. To be successful (i.e. ‘swim’) institutions
hould therefore provide a close match with watershed conditions
o minimise such costs (Lubell, 2005).
In consequence, Sabatier et al. argue that:
‘. . . the likelihood of partnership formation and success
increases with stakeholder valuations of the beneﬁts of part-
nerships, decreases with the magnitude of transaction costs
involved in forming and running a partnership, and increases
with the resources available to pay those costs’ (Sabatier et al.,
2005c: 180).
Consequently, one can measure formation and success in terms
f institutional changes through time, i.e. what Sabatier et al.
2005a: 14) term ‘process’. In their argument, it follows for collabo-
ative arrangements that where transaction costs, such as the need
or partnerships to develop a scientiﬁc understanding of any pol-
ution problems in the watershed, exceed the ﬁnancial or technical
bility of stakeholders to undertake it, their birth or subsequent
evelopment will be impaired. Indeed, the authors identify the
ssue of life histories as something requiring future research (Lubell
t al., 2005: 295).
he emergence of watershed partnerships in the USA—empirical
atterns
Watershed management has a long history in the USA (Sabatier
t al., 2005b; Gerlak, 2006). Although watershed scale initiatives
ate back some time, early federal institutional responses such as
he Tennessee Valley Authority (1933) were central agency domi-
ated (Andrews, 2006). This situation began to change in response
o a number of drivers, most saliently federal legislative inter-
ention in state water pollution control under the 1972 Clean
ater Act (CWA) amendments (i.e. top down). Section 303 of
he Act compelled states to control non-point source pollution in
mpaired watersheds. Subsequent federal legislation, most notably
he 1987 amendments to the CWA, has been employed by federal
gencies to promote collaborative forms of watershed manage-
ent in states for addressing non-point source pollution (Hardy
nd Koontz, 2008). Other federal legislation and policy, includ-
ng agricultural extension and the Safe Drinking Water Act, also
ncreasingly promoted these practices, for example in the New York
ity watershed (Smith and Porter, 2010). At the same time, there
ere also drivers of a more bottom up nature, both at state level,
hrough legal and policy measures, and community level where
roups emerged in response to factors such as public dissatisfac-
ion with federal or state government measures to protect water
esources, and frustration with the often contested and litigious
ature of top down environmental management (Wondolleck and
affee, 2000; Sabatier et al., 2005b). As a result of these two  kinds of
rivers – top down and bottom up – the USA has experienced a rapidicy 30 (2013) 748– 757 751
expansion in the number and scope of watershed partnerships (see
Leach and Pelkey, 2001; Duram et al., 2008), although as discussed
above multiple deﬁnitions of them appear in the literature.
So what, according to the PCF, are the factors which most
strongly affect partnership formation and sustainability? Sabatier
et al. maintain that partnership ‘formation and success’ are more
likely in certain biophysical, institutional and community condi-
tions (Sabatier et al., 2005c: 181–182). Firstly, they argue that they
appear where the beneﬁts of collective action are high, as for the
case of environmental problems that are non-homogenous, not
easily addressed through top-down regulation and hence impose
widespread transaction costs on regulators, for example non-point
source water pollution. Partnerships are also argued to be more
prevalent where: the problem is perceived to be chronic enough
to require collaborative action; where available scientiﬁc knowl-
edge on pollution sources reduces information costs; where higher
level institutions such as central government agencies ﬁnancially
support partnership formation through the provision of grants
and subsidies; where higher level institutions actively encourage
some local autonomy; and where different forms of capital – both
human and social – are sufﬁciently high in communities to stim-
ulate and facilitate effective group or individual participation. In
addition, the authors maintain that partnerships form and success-
fully grow under several other ‘community attributes’ (Sabatier
et al., 2005c: 181–182), including where watersheds are dominated
by a mixture of industries. By way of contrast, partnerships are
deemed to be less likely where problems are homogenous, geo-
graphically deﬁned (e.g. point source pollution), non-severe and
where scientiﬁc knowledge is poor. Additionally, the authors sug-
gest that partnerships are less prevalent where problems are being
addressed by existing institutions, where there is a lack of sub-
sidy and autonomy from existing institutions, where community
attributes such as human and social capital are lacking, individ-
ual citizen involvement is low and ‘extractive’ industries such as
mining dominate economically. The latter is deemed signiﬁcant as
such industries are argued to be short-termist in outlook, primarily
concerned with extracting resources and often resistant to environ-
mental regulation. In mixed local economies, where service sectors
such as tourism attach greater value to environmental quality and
lobby for regulation, conﬂicts could arise over resource use pro-
viding both a rationale and incentives for all parties to engage in
collaborative management solutions.
Not all of the hypotheses identiﬁed by Sabatier et al. (2005c)
are tested in this paper. Two hypotheses relating to social mobility,
relating to the valuation of long-term beneﬁts, and cultural hetero-
geneity were not tested because of the difﬁculty of assessing the
former factor at the catchment scale (data of this type is generally
generated for higher institutional scales in the UK), and deﬁn-
ing ‘cultural heterogeneity’ in the UK context—a concept which is
rather problematic to test. However, ten were employed to develop
an analytical framework (Table 1) for further testing. As part of this
research, several dedicated quantitative indicators were also devel-
oped to test each hypothesis which also draw on earlier research
(Lubell et al., 2002) but adapt them speciﬁcally to testing the PCF
(see Table 1).
In the next section we start to test how far these hypotheses
explain the formation of ‘watershed partnerships’ in the UK.
Swimming or sinking? Catchment groups in the UK
Moving the focus to the UK immediately raises a conceptual
travelling issue, because in the UK the popular term for a water-
shed is in fact a catchment. Moreover, management at a catchment
scale is not an entirely novel practice in the UK, with the gover-
nance of water resources at the river basin scale dating back to the
752 D. Benson et al. / Land Use Policy 30 (2013) 748– 757
Table 1
A political contracting framework for explaining “formation of watershed partnerships”.
Watershed attributes Key hypotheses for partnership emergence Indicators
Biophysical ‘Partnerships are more likely to form where environmental
problems are heterogeneous in nature and geographically
dispersed, such as non-point source pollution.’
Type of environmental problems (i.e. point source, non-point
source)
‘Partnerships are more likely to form where environmental
problems are severe or perceived by most actors to be severe.’
Severity of environmental problems and their perception
‘Partnerships are more likely to form where scientiﬁc knowledge
about the problem is very good.’
Access to scientiﬁc evidence
Institutional ‘Partnerships are more likely to form when an existing institution
has  enough resources to subsidise initial transaction costs.’
Extent of funding
‘Partnerships are more likely to form when existing institutions
are not actively addressing watershed problems.’
Trigger for group formation
‘Partnerships are more likely to form where higher-level
institutions grant local autonomy.’
Source of leadership
Community ‘Partnerships are more likely to form in communities with high
existing stores of human and social capital.’
Extent of social capital (trust, participation) and human capital
(income, education) etc.
‘Partnerships are more likely to form in communities where the
costs and beneﬁts of management actions are spread equitably
over different segments of the community.’
Individuals participating in management
‘Partnerships are less likely to form in communities dominated by
extractive industries.’
Land use in watershed, presence of a mixed local economy
‘Partnerships are more likely to form in communities dominated
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erived from: Sabatier et al. (2005c: 182) and Lubell et al. (2002).
940s (Cook, 1998). Although approaches to catchment manage-
ent emerged at this time, they largely reﬂected the rather closed,
echnocratic style of environmental governance and pollution con-
rol found under the ‘traditional approach’ in the USA. As in the
SA, more collaborative, multi-stakeholder catchment groups are,
n contrast, a much more recent phenomenon, emerging in the
ast decade from bottom-up processes of community and special
nterest engagement in local scale resource management processes
Cook et al., 2012). We  can better understand this temporally and
eographically differentiated form of development through a brief
verview of the history of water management.
UK water management was initially characterised by strong
ocal control followed more recently by a trend towards regionali-
ation, privatisation and greater central agency direction. Bell and
cGillivray (2000) show how, prior to the Second World War, most
asks for water management, primarily water supply and sewage
reatment, were allocated to local authorities, while other tasks
uch as pollution control, drainage and ﬁsheries came to be insti-
utionalised at the catchment scale through the creation of a skein
f small technocratic agencies. Attempts to rationalise this loose
atchwork of institutional arrangements began in 1948 with the
iver Boards Act, thereby creating a national system of catchment
ased river boards, followed by river authorities, that assumed con-
rol of water tasks apart from supply and sewage treatment (Bell
nd McGillivray, 2000). By the mid  1970s, control over virtually all
ater functions in England and Wales had been shifted to regional
ater authorities, whose activities were organised around speciﬁc
iver basins (Haigh, 2005: 4.1). Increasing problems caused by these
hanges led to more radical government restructuring of water
anagement in the Water Act 1989 through the creation of a set
f privatised water companies to provide services (Cook, 1998).
 new national government agency, the National Rivers Author-
ty was formed at the same time to police water pollution (see
eale, 1992: 105–106); it was subsequently incorporated into the
ewly-created Environment Agency in 1996.
Introduction of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) in
000 was signiﬁcant both for setting ambitious targets for improve-
ents in water quality and because its Article 14 necessitatesnformation to be provided to, and consultation to take place with,
he public and relevant stakeholder groups during implementa-
ion, and in particular for preparation of River Basin Management
lans (RBMPs) (Carter and Howe, 2006). At least three levels ofstakeholder involvement are envisaged: access to information and
documents used to guide the RBMPs; consultation at various stages
of the RBMP preparation process; and active involvement dur-
ing implementation and any subsequent modiﬁcation of the plans
(Carter and Howe, 2006; European Commission, 2000). The Envi-
ronment Agency is designated as the competent authority for
implementation of the WFD  and did organise a process of public
consultation as part of the preparation of RBMPs which included
formation of the multi-stakeholder representative WFD  River Basin
District Liaison Panels.
In contrast to these government or water industry-inspired
approaches, locally initiated stakeholder catchment groups, includ-
ing partnerships of responsible agencies, do not have a long history
in the UK. Until recently such groups were rare and little was known
about their characteristics. The primary purpose of the survey (Cook
et al., 2012) – the ﬁrst of its kind – was to reveal their essential
attributes. In the next section we provide a brief overview of the
main patterns in the data, address the issue of functional equiva-
lence and then sketch out their life histories.
UK catchment groups: a quantitative survey
General characteristics
The survey revealed that two major types of catchment group
are discernible in the UK context. As in our description of the
survey approach above, we have termed these ‘statutory’ and ‘non-
statutory’ groups. As regards the former the leading examples are
the Environment Agency organised River Basin District Liaison Pan-
els in each of the eleven river basin districts in England and Wales.
Other similar state directed multi-stakeholder consultation fora are
the Catchment Flood Management Plan Steering Groups, Regional
Environment Protection Advisory Committees (REPAC), Regional
Fisheries, Ecology and Recreation Advisory Committees (RFERAC)
and Regional Flood Defence Committees (RFDC, now Regional Flood
and Coastal Committees (RFCCs)). With a narrower focus on deliv-
ery of farm advice, capital grants and adoption of best management
practices to control agricultural water pollution, the England Catch-
ment Sensitive Farming Delivery Initiative has operated in ﬁfty
priority catchments, each with a stakeholder Catchment Steering
Group (CSG). The function of each CSG is to engage local stake-
holders, primarily farmers, in implementation of the initiative in
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degradation, or in anticipation of future problems (17%).
In addition, the PCF hypotheses would suggest that in the
USA, the availability of scientiﬁc knowledge on pollution sourcesD. Benson et al. / Land U
onjunction with the statutory agencies Natural England and the
nvironment Agency.
Secondly, as revealed below, a number of more collaborative
d hoc catchment groups have appeared (or ‘dived in’) indepen-
ently of government inﬂuence in the period since 1995. The survey
evealed the existence of thirty nine such groups in England and
ales. In comparison to the USA, where Duram et al. (2008) record
ver 1000 local watershed groups, this number is very low and lim-
ts the potential for quantitative ‘meta-comparisons’ of the type
ited in Sabatier et al. (2005a). This disparity may  be related to the
uch larger physical scale and population of the USA, and to dif-
erences in higher level governance; factors that are returned to in
ur conclusions. An overview of this overall ‘population’ of thirty
ine in England and Wales shows several general features for this
ub-type of groups. In terms of legal status, most were constituted
s either charities (46%) or limited companies (36%). A majority,
oreover, had limited incomes, with 69% surviving on an annual
ncome of £50,000 or less.
xploring the functional equivalence with US practices
The ﬁrst question posed above was whether the concept of
atchment groups in the UK is functionally equivalent to that found
n the US based literature. If they are, then there are good rea-
ons for believing that it could serve as a basis for comparative
esearch. Using the deﬁnitions of collaborative watershed manage-
ent approaches supplied by Sabatier et al. (2005a: 6–7), several
eatures are apparent. Firstly, little evidence was  found of what
he authors refer to as ‘collaborative engagement processes’ com-
rised of dispute resolution for catchment management planning
n the UK, suggesting this concept is not really equivalent (Sabatier
t al., 2005a: 6–7).  Secondly, their notion of collaborative supera-
encies only partly resonates with the state-led groups identiﬁed
n the UK study. In England and Wales, the bodies described above
re formalised fora for discussion of catchment scale issues that
nclude private, public and civil society agencies, but they remain
dvisory in nature and lack decision making power or responsibil-
ty for implementation (such responsibilities continuing to reside
ith the Environment Agency as designated competent authority).
et one clear difference is in terms of their number and coverage.
abatier et al. argue that in the US they are ‘still quite rare’ (Sabatier
t al., 2005a: 7), but in England and Wales there are eleven River
asin District Liaison Panels that provide a national coverage.
Functional equivalence is more apparent if we take the con-
ept of ‘collaborative watershed partnerships’. Just as in the USA,
K groups were primarily informally convened, often by non-
overnmental stakeholders although they included a variety of
overnment and state actors. Indeed, the majority of UK stake-
olders were landowners, community and interest groups (see
elow). Many groups, like their US counterparts, engaged in devel-
ping management plans for countering a variety of environmental
ssues, from speciﬁc projects to land use problems and water qual-
ty concerns. Catchment groups in the UK were also found to be
stablished as long-term management options rather than created
o deal with a speciﬁc problem and then wound down. Another
nteresting comparison revealed by the survey was  that UK groups
lso had little statutory or legal authority in respect of environ-
ental management, often being constituted as charities (46%) or
imited companies (36%), mirroring the non-proﬁt organisational
tatus of many US partnerships (see Koontz et al., 2004). Finally,
K groups also acted primarily as negotiating forums working with
stablished agencies, thereby complimenting their functions rather
han replacing them. As in the US, some UK groups (such as River
rusts) also received funding from state agencies.
Some limited stretching of the concept of watershed partner-
hip is, however, apparent: US watershed partnerships do differ to
roups in the UK in terms of the political structures within whichicy 30 (2013) 748– 757 753
they operate, i.e. multi-level federal vs. devolving unitary. So the
question then is how much stretching is too much? Here, we  move
into slightly abstract theoretical territory. Researchers invariably
cannot, contra Sartori (1970),  ﬁnd an exact conceptual match for
speciﬁc phenomenon when moving between contexts unless the
concept has a universally common interpretation.3 Therefore our
pragmatic response is to accept that for our purposes the two  are
indeed functionally equivalent.
Life histories
The life histories of some of these UK partnerships can be traced
out from the information collected in the survey. Of the thirty-
nine examples identiﬁed, only ﬁve surviving partnerships were
established before 1990. Well over half the partnerships (22) were
founded after 2001, with fourteen dating from 2006. Over time,
greater numbers were clearly overcoming the inertia of initial
transaction costs to establish and sustain themselves, i.e. ‘swim-
ming’. What was not apparent from the data, however, was how
many groups during this period had not survived beyond initial
start-up (i.e. they ‘sank’). Such information proved difﬁcult to col-
lect, if it existed at all.
Theoretical interpretation
Having shown that the partnership concept does travel from
the US to another context (the UK), how well does the PCF theory
explain the development of collaborative watershed partnerships
in the two  jurisdictions? In other words, how well does it ‘travel’?
In this section, each case is compared and contrasted on the basis
of the main propositions of the PCF.
Main propositions
Biophysical factors
Some important, theoretically relevant trends emerge in the
data. In terms of biophysical factors, according to Sabatier et al.
(2005c: 182), emergence of partnerships is ‘more likely where
environmental problems are perceived to be heterogeneous. . .and
geographically dispersed’, for example non-point source water pol-
lution, thereby increasing the beneﬁts of collective action. The
survey suggests this rationale was evident with respondents per-
ceiving a variety of more diffuse environmental issues (as opposed
to single, geographically limited issues) as signiﬁcant in shaping
their activities.
With regards to the perception of the severity of environmental
problems (Table 1), respondents were questioned as to the rela-
tive importance of water quality improvement to the partnership.
Over half – 54% – stated that this issue was  ‘very important’, sug-
gesting the perception of water pollution as an issue was a critical
factor driving their emergence. Only 2.6% of partnerships suggested
it was  not important. Interestingly, the perceived severity of other
environmental problems was also a factor, with over 50% of groups
stating that habitat protection, landscape protection and water
quantity management were either important or very important.
This perception is correlated with the responses to questioning
over the trigger factors that initiated partnership formation. A small
majority of respondents (52%) stated their partnerships had formed
speciﬁcally in response to concerns over existing environmental3 For example, the notion of public participation is deﬁned in the Water
Framework Directive according to speciﬁc legal requirements, although differing
interpretations are placed on the concept in Member States (Benson et al., 2012).
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romotes partnership formation and success. This feature may  be
igniﬁcant in the UK. Respondents were asked how strong a bar-
ier to meeting management objectives was the lack of access to
echnical data. From the sample, UK partnerships certainly found
ccessing technical information relating to catchments (for exam-
le, water quality data) relatively straightforward. Only 2.6% of
espondents felt it was a signiﬁcant barrier. In total, 73% disagreed
n some way that it was difﬁcult to access. The survey did not, how-
ver, focus on the sources of scientiﬁc information (and hence a
atter for further investigation).
nstitutional factors
Sabatier et al. (2005c: 181) maintain that partnership emer-
ence in the USA is correlated with existing public bodies
ubsidising their formation to help them overcome transaction
osts and situations where agencies are not addressing problems
dequately (Table 1). By way of comparison, the survey shows that
n the UK, subsidies from public agencies were in reality quite
ow. In fact, various public sector agencies contributed only 15% of
evenues, with local government only providing 6.7% and central
overnment 0.8%. Signiﬁcant funding was provided by non-public
ources including private individuals (18%) grant giving trusts (15%)
nd membership fees (12% of revenues). Evidently, UK partnerships
ere primarily privately self-funded but, critically, not ﬁnancially
ndependent of public institutions. It was also apparent that exist-
ng institutions were failing to actively address problems. As stated
bove, many partnerships (52%) stated that environmental degra-
ation was a primary reason for their establishment. Very few
rgued that they formed in response to existing regulation, while
here was generally a perceived disconnection with the regional
cale Water Framework Directive process.
Existing state agencies and government bodies did, however,
rovide some support for both start-up and development. The sur-
ey found that state bodies forming the ‘driving force’ behind initial
tart-up were the Environment Agency (in 10% of partnerships),
atural England (5.8%) and local authorities (4.3%). Yet, other stake-
olders – ﬁsheries or landowner interests (35% of groups) – were
erceived as being more critical in the birth of partnerships. In
erms of their membership proﬁle, existing public bodies provided
imited ongoing support. Environment Agency staff constituted
.6% of their membership, while other institutions such as Natural
ngland (1.3%), local authorities (17%) and Regional Development
gencies (1.3%) also contributed members.
Yet, as Sabatier et al. predict for the US context, partnerships
equire sufﬁcient autonomy from government agencies for collab-
ration to ‘dive in’ and then ‘swim’. In the UK, decision-making
n partnerships was generally undertaken in an autonomous man-
er. When asked about who ‘leads’ in decision-making, ﬁsheries
nd landowner interests formed the most signiﬁcant actors (23%
f partnerships) along with private actors (18%) and environmen-
al charities (8%). In fact, as predicted by the theory, government
gency control was quite limited in these arrangements with the
nvironment Agency and Natural England providing leadership in
nly 7% and 5% of partnerships respectively.
ommunity factors
Sabatier et al. (2005c: 182) then hypothesise that a variety of
actors sustain partnership formation and success, i.e. ‘swimming’
Table 1). While it was not possible to test all these hypotheses, the
K survey provided evidence for most of them. Firstly, the argu-
ent that partnerships are more likely where human and social
apital is high appears partially true in the UK. Although it was
ot possible to determine exact income levels at each catchment
cale, average incomes in England and Wales, despite regional
nd local variations, are generally high by international compar-
son (OECD, 2010). Also, education levels are similarly high in bothicy 30 (2013) 748– 757
countries. But in contrast to the USA, participation by the ‘public’
in partnerships was  rather limited with few exceeding 100 active
members. Indeed, private individual participation constituted only
28% of membership, with the bulk of members represented by
ﬁsheries/landowner interests (18%) and various public institutions
(22%). Yet ‘trust’, a key indicator of social capital in theoretical argu-
ments (for example, Putnam, 2000), is strongly apparent within
institutional development (and also noted as a mechanism that can
reduce transaction costs, Sabatier et al., 2005c).  When questioned,
over 60% of partnerships stated that, to varying degrees, their expe-
riences suggested that trusting other organisations in managing
catchments was  relatively easy. Less stated that trust was difﬁcult
to build. Although ‘trust’ is inherently difﬁcult to quantify, and war-
rants further research, it does nonetheless appear a strong factor in
relation to sustained activity (‘swimming’).
As discussed above, two of the PCF hypotheses were not tested
in the UK context, although data showed how costs and bene-
ﬁts of management actions were spread between different actors,
including individual citizens. It was  apparent that local community
individuals were contributing to partnership activities, although
special interests are also heavily represented. Private individuals
represented 28% of membership, suggesting local communities are
strongly contributing and hence perceive the beneﬁts of the con-
tracting process. Fisheries and landowners (18%), NGOs (9%), parish
councils (8%) and community groups (7%) were also represented,
with businesses, water companies and various local authorities and
public agencies making up the rest. Individuals, it would appear,
were willing to bear some of the transaction costs, just as the theory
predicts.
Finally, the data on land use provided some pointers to eco-
nomic activity with respondents suggesting that, overwhelmingly,
mixed (i.e. agricultural, industrial and urban) activities existed in
the watersheds in which partnerships were located. Indeed, 57%
of land in rivers trusts groups surveyed, was used for agriculture,
generally dairying and arable–both well known sources of diffuse
pollution. Unlike the USA, where extractive industries (for exam-
ple, minerals mining, logging) are argued to prohibit partnerships,
few of the UK catchments were in areas of signiﬁcant extractive
industrial activity. That said, primary productive activities such as
farming were prominent in many catchments.
Testing the hypotheses
In this respect, the development of the partnerships in the two
jurisdictions does appear to be occurring where certain factors
combined to lower transaction costs. Biophysical factors related
to the heterogeneous characteristics of environmental problems
would appear to be just as critical in stimulating their emer-
gence in the UK as they are in the USA. All the partnerships
surveyed emerged or ‘dived in’ due to the perception of problems
of various types and degrees, i.e. problems were not homoge-
nous. The perception of the severity of environmental problems
did appear to be signiﬁcant factors within partnerships. In addi-
tion, scientiﬁc knowledge on pollution was relatively widespread
in the watersheds and may  be helping reduce transaction
costs.
Yet in institutional terms, government bodies in the UK have not
widely subsidised the costs of collaborative activities. Clearly UK
partnerships were ﬁnding alternative approaches to overcoming
transaction costs associated with development than those pre-
dicted by the theory, i.e. they are ‘swimming’ harder than predicted.
From the data collected, this would appear to include multi-
ple sources such as charitable trusts and membership fees. This
contrasts with the situation in the USA where although many part-
nerships emanate from the non-proﬁt sector, federal, state and local
government provide greater institutional support to watershed
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nitiatives (Lubell et al., 2002). State and local government agen-
ies are often critical in this respect. Unlike in the UK, watershed
artnerships in the US also receive signiﬁcant funding, technical
ssistance and logistical support from federal and state government
gencies through legal and policy mechanisms including inter alia
oil conservation districts, agricultural extension and grants under
he national Clean Water Act (1987). Critically, what was less clear
rom the data was whether lack of government support was  impact-
ng the survival chances (i.e. ‘sinking’) of UK partnerships, as the
heory would infer. Data could not easily be collected on partner-
hips that had ‘sunk’, therefore it was impossible to explore the
ounterfactual.
From a community perspective, the data also show some slight
ivergences with practices in the USA. What is evident is the rel-
tively strong engagement of special interests in UK watershed
artnerships. Reasons for this are difﬁcult to determine from the
urvey, and hence could be a subject of further in-depth qualitative
tudy. Possible factors may  be the differences in land ownership in
he UK where private interests and ﬁsheries tend to have a greater
ay in water management (Cook, 1998). Private citizens were, how-
ver, also engaged in UK partnerships. Yet whether greater human
nd social capital is more evident in the USA would require further
nvestigation although it is nonetheless argued to be signiﬁcant
n overcoming transaction costs (Lubell et al., 2002). Finally, the
otion that a mixed economy is a signiﬁcant contributing factor
o partnership development is difﬁcult to substantiate in the UK
ontext.
onclusions
Collaborative approaches to watershed management have
ecome much more common in the USA over the last decade. Their
rowth – allied to the normative appeal of local action and partic-
pation in pursuing sustainable development (Benson et al., 2013)
 has led to big claims being made about the changing extent of
ollaborative environmental governance more generally. Yet the
ontemporaneous growth of similar forms in other, non US con-
exts such as the EU and Australia (Benson et al., 2012, 2013), raises
mportant but as yet unanswered questions over why and in what
orm they are developing, and whether their development can be
xplained by the same theories.
The collaboration literature contains multiple interpretations
f the concept of collaboration (Benson et al., 2012, 2013). Our
nalysis has shown that with more careful conceptual and empiri-
al analysis, the putative shift towards ‘more collaboration’ in fact
lays out rather differently in particular countries. It is apparent for
xample that only one of the three main sub-types of collaboration
dentiﬁed by Sabatier et al. (2005a) is present in the different insti-
utional context of the UK, although a number of state-led fora that
ear similarities to the conception of collaborative superagencies
ere detected. The national coverage established for these fora is
 feature that is the reverse of the USA, where Sabatier et al. argue
hat the number of superagencies is low; a conclusion that res-
nates strongly with Pierson’s (1994) argument that the UK is more
olitically centralised, although devolution processes are gaining
omentum.
On the basis of this ﬁnding, we explored whether collaborative
ctivities in the two cases are functionally equivalent. Drawing on
he distinguishing characteristics of collaborative watershed part-
erships, it was apparent that UK groups do share many features
ith those in the USA. In other words, the partnership concept does
ppear to travel from the US to the UK. Our evidence also shows
hat UK partnerships, as Sabatier et al. (2005a) equally suggest, are
omplementing rather than replacing the actions of the state-led
roups, although in empirically quite different ways.icy 30 (2013) 748– 757 755
Our data revealed a picture of a small but growing number of
watershed partnerships, the majority of which have appeared in
the last decade. They are evolving (or ‘diving in’ and ‘swimming’)
in response to a number of environmental problems, although the
perceived desire to address diffuse water quality issues appears to
have been an especially important driver. These bodies have drawn
upon resources from a variety of sources, although levels of funding
still remain low. Most, however, have managed to retain autonomy
over decision-making and, unlike the WFD  and Catchment Sensi-
tive Farming initiatives, are not agency-dependent. While difﬁcult
to deﬁne precisely, the degree of human and social capital within
partnerships appears mixed with a variety of actors playing active
roles in their management structures.
In many ways, the hypotheses do serve as accurate predictors
of the factors inﬂuencing the development of UK partnerships. This
observation is all the more surprising, given the obvious differ-
ences between the UK and the USA. These include their respective
institutional characteristics, as well as land use patterns and the
availability of funding. Yet our analysis also indicates some areas
where the theory struggled to account for patterns of institu-
tional development, most notably the apparent lack of government
agency collaboration when compared to the US.
Overall, the PCF is broadly capable of explaining patterns of part-
nership development, although it remains constrained by several
factors, which could be fruitfully subjected to further development.
Thus, the transaction costs argument did identify the biophysi-
cal factors driving formation and development, but struggled to
explain why  a lack of centralised support was seemingly not a major
determinant. It may  well be that UK groups are emerging in reac-
tion to – rather than because of – the traditional centralised form
of control typical of environmental management. In the USA, col-
laboration and delegation are more embedded into the political
system, although Lubell et al. (2002: 159) note that groups emerge
in response to a ‘disillusionment with state and federal alterna-
tives’. In addition, the inﬂuence of the lack of funding and agency
assistance can only really be tested over longer time scales. The PCF
predictions in relation to the signiﬁcance of high levels of social
capital did, however, appear relevant. Collaboration did seem to be
generating high degrees of trust between different stakeholders.
While public participation was reasonably strong in the UK survey,
subtly different dynamics in terms of socio-cultural attitudes to
collaborative environmental management may  exist vis-à-vis the
US context. Another difference was  the rather limited involvement
of governmental agencies when compared to practice in the USA.
‘Travelling’, in other words, is possible, but not trouble free.
Yet, as noted above, we must also be wary of differences in phys-
ical, demographic and higher level governance conditions between
the USA and the UK as these may  also be inﬂuencing factors on
the numbers of collaborative watershed partnerships. These gov-
ernance forms may  be more amenable to the US context which
has a much larger and diverse landmass, more extensive catch-
ments and a larger rural population. Collaborative approaches in
fact may  be one of the only viable means for agencies to manage
certain water resources, and this is facilitated by strong traditions
of local autonomy under delegated authority within multi-level
federal structures.
Nonetheless, having examined one theory in some depth and
found that it holds up to empirical testing, what is the scope for
new work in this area? In modifying the main propositions to make
them more generalisable, clearly collaboration (at least in the UK) is
not entirely dependent on agency support, but that in order to over-
come transaction costs partnerships have had to generate funding
from external sources, including public bodies, at a very early stage.
Our analysis suggests that the ability to generate funding per se
rather than receiving it from central sources, is perhaps more crit-
ical, although as discussed above the lack of a counterfactual in
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erms of ‘sinking’ in the UK makes it difﬁcult to test new hypotheses.
ommunity hypotheses may  also require some additional modiﬁ-
ation. Catchment partnerships in the UK did, in some cases, appear
o be developing without strong public engagement suggesting it is
esirable but not exactly necessary to development. As opposed to
he US, where public involvement in the provision of local envi-
onmental services is driven by a spirit of community self-help
nd civic responsibility, the situation in the UK is more complex.
nvironmental protection has traditionally been the preserve of
overnment agencies and private companies resulting in relatively
imited public engagement (Cook, 1998). High levels of human and
ocial capital are therefore important in hypothesising but this
ust also take account of socio-cultural factors such as community
dentity. Finally, the claim that a mixed economy is required for
evelopment does travel, although hypothesising could be modi-
ed to focus more on the inﬂuence of primary rather than extractive
ndustries, for example farming (and, in the UK, types of agricultural
ctivity). A new hypothesis might explore whether partnerships are
ore likely to emerge where speciﬁc farming practices impact pop-
lations or industries such as water service provision, since it is in
he latter’s interests to seek collaborative solutions.
A major weakness – and thus a priority for further study in both
he USA and the UK – is the lack of understanding of factors that will
etermine the longer term sustainability and success of collabora-
ive watershed and catchment partnerships. In part, they remain a
ecent phenomenon and thus sufﬁciently long time series data for
elevant indicators of process and outcomes are not available. Given
unding constraints, self-monitoring by partnerships is also often
nadequate as priority is given to implementation of on-the-ground
atchment improvement measures. For key aspects of water qual-
ty, the physical response times of catchment bio-physical systems
ay  also be long; important if demonstrable success is such a key
actor for sustaining both stakeholder and partner engagement, and
uture sources of funding. Despite these limitations, the ‘popula-
ions’ of initiatives that now exist in the USA, UK and elsewhere
rovide a basis to researching these issues in future.
The key point we want to make in conclusion is that the scope
or a more comparative analysis of these topics is great. Our ﬁnd-
ngs identify new research directions that could be taken, both
or the ﬁeld of water policy and comparative environmental gov-
rnance research more generally. Having shown that theoretical
rguments and their associated concepts do travel, the door is now
pen to the development of more universally applicable theories of
ollaboration that transcend national contexts. This could proceed
ia a broader-based study of other EU states, where similar part-
ership approaches are emerging in water management, although
his would need to be wary of concept stretching. This work could
ventually be extended beyond the EU to other states where collab-
rative watershed approaches have also been established (Benson
t al., 2012, 2013), such as Australia, New Zealand or Canada. In
ddition, more in-depth comparative case testing of the theory
ould also be envisaged. However, if this stretching deforms the
ore concept of watershed partnership too far beyond its origi-
al US-based conception, then perhaps new theories and concepts
ill eventually have to be considered. Either way, the opportuni-
ies for interesting new comparative work – both theoretical and
mpirical – in this important area of contemporary environmental
overnance are very signiﬁcant.
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